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 NOTE 
Imputed Liability: How to Determine When 
Parent Companies Should Be Held Liable 
for the Patent Infringements of Their 
Subsidiary Companies 
Emma Tracy* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The issuance of a patent allows the patentee the legal right to exclude 
others from manufacturing, using, selling, or importing the patented inven-
tion.1  This legal right exists for as long as the patentee holds the patent.2  
Although most patents are not owned by their creators,3 both inventors, who 
spend years laboring over an idea that comes to fruition, and those who ob-
tain patent rights via other means may wish to profit from their patent.  Con-
sequently, infringements are not taken lightly.  When a company in a subsidi-
ary position infringes upon another company’s patent, the victims of patent 
infringement are frequently not being compensated for harm caused by a sub-
sidiary company’s infringements.  Subsequently, when a subsidiary company 
 
* B.S., Animal Sciences, University of Missouri, 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of 
Missouri School of Law, 2018; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2016–
2017.  I would like to extend a special thank you to Professor Dennis Crouch and the 
entire Missouri Law Review staff for their support in writing this Note.  I would also 
like to thank Matthew Davis for his insight and guidance throughout my topic selec-
tion and editing process.  Finally, I would like to thank my fiancé, Justin Masse, and 
my family for their unwavering support. 
 1. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012); Lauren Maida, Note, Patent Claim Construction: 
It’s Not a Pure Matter of Law, so Why Isn’t the Federal Circuit Giving the District 
Courts the Deference They Deserve? 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1773, 1776 (2009). 
 2. See §§ 261, 271; WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and 
Use, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 27 (2008), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/489/wipo_pub_489.pdf.  Patents 
issued before June 8, 1995, were valid for up to seventeen years from the date the 
patent was granted or up to twenty years from the filing date (whichever was longer).  
See Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity, FDA, 
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/ucm079031.htm#howlongpa
tentterm (last updated Dec. 5, 2016). 
 3. Patents are typically either transferred by means of an employment agree-
ment or assigned to a corporate owner.  See Dennis Crouch, AIA Shifts USPTO Focus 
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cannot pay the damages arising from its infringement, the liability is tradi-
tionally imputed to the parent company.4 
This Note examines the theory and principles behind three traditional 
methods used to hold parent companies liable for the infringing actions of 
their subsidiaries.  These methods include traditional agency principles of tort 
law, piercing of the corporate veil, and inducement principles outlined in § 
271(b) of the Patent Act.  This Note then discusses how these three methods 
differ in both the underlying theories they employ, and the subsequent out-
comes they achieve, when it comes to fundamental issues of inducement lia-
bility.  This analysis will include what type of conduct is required and what 
level of knowledge is necessary to impute liability under each theory. 
Part II of this Note introduces the historical and legal background of the 
three traditional methods of imputing liability.  Part III then highlights the 
recent developments with respect to these three methods and how they apply 
to patent infringement cases.  Part IV of this Note examines the similarities 
and differences between the three traditional methods (paying special atten-
tion to inducement under § 271(b)) and analyzes them as they apply to both 
corporate business cases and patent law cases.  Finally, this Note concludes in 
Part V with a brief comment on the future use of these methods and why the 
judicial system should try to adhere to bright line rules – as opposed to un-
predictable balancing tests – whenever possible when determining imputed 
liability, leaving balancing tests only for the situations that demand increased 
flexibility and adjustability. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part traces the history of the three most common methods of imput-
ing liability to parent companies and shows how and when courts decide 
which method to use.  A common reason for creating a subsidiary company5 
is to limit the parent’s potential liability.6  However, these liability limitations 
may frustrate the parent company if the subsidiary is unable to remedy its 
own violations due to underfunding – when the subsidiary does not have 
enough assets to fulfill a judgment.  When a subsidiary company infringes a 
patent, a plaintiff will often sue the parent company, in addition to the subsid-
iary company, in hopes of recovering a greater amount, even if the subsidiary 
 
 4. See William A. Voxman, Comment, Jurisdiction over a Parent Corporation 
in Its Subsidiary’s State of Incorporation, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 327 (1992). 
 5. For most large companies, the standard structure of the business includes a 
parent company (or sole shareholder) of many smaller and “separately incorporated” 
smaller subsidiary companies.  See John H. Matheson, The Modern Law of Corporate 
Groups: An Empirical Study of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the Parent-Subsidiary 
Context, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1094 (2009). 
 6. Bernard F. Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man Companies and Subsid-
iary Corporations, 18 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 473, 488 (1953). 
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is capable of providing relief on its own.7  To be considered an infringement, 
a person or organization lacking authority to do so must “make[], use[], of-
fer[] to sell, or sell[] any patented invention.”8  Though there are other ways 
that liability can be imputed to a parent company, this Note will focus on the 
three traditional methods of holding parent companies liable for the infringe-
ments of their subsidiaries: imputing liability via agency law principles, im-
puting liability by means of piercing the corporate veil, and imputing liability 
through standard 271(b) inducement principles. 
A.  Imputing Liability Through Agency Principles 
One way to impute liability is through principles of agency law.  As Jus-
tice Wiley Rutledge once said in a 1944 Supreme Court case, “Few problems 
in the law have given greater variety of application and conflict in results than 
the cases arising in the borderland between what is clearly an employer-
employee relationship and what is clearly one of independent entrepreneurial 
dealing.”9  To be deemed an “employee” or an “employer” within the context 
of agency principles, courts typically perform a “right to control” analysis.10  
Using this analysis, courts consider factors such as an employer’s desire to 
preserve control or the ability to manipulate the employee.11  Courts use this 
employee-employer test when deciding whether a parent-subsidiary relation-
ship exists and have noted that the “[d]ominion may be so complete . . . that 
by the general rules of agency the parent will be a principal and the subsidiary 
an agent.”12 
When determining whether a subsidiary is considered an agent of the 
parent corporation, courts look to whether there exists “a close business rela-
tion between the two companies.”13  If the subsidiary is an agent of the par-
ent, the subsidiary must be conducting business for the parent on the parent’s 
behalf and under the parent’s control,14 and the parent may therefore be held 
 
 7. Voxman, supra note 4, at 327.  There does not seem to be any obvious rea-
son to neglect suing the parent company in addition to the subsidiary.  As Voxman 
explains, one of the most important times to include the parent company as a defend-
ant is when the subsidiary cannot financially provide complete recovery.  Id. 
 8. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). 
 9. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944), overruled in part, Na-
tionwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992). 
 10. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Employees, Employers, and Quasi-Employers: An 
Analysis of Employees and Employers Who Operate in the Borderland Between an 
Employer-and-Employee Relationship, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 605, 617–18 (2012). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926). 
 13. Richard H. Burgess, Liability of Parent Corporation for Tort of Subsidiary, 
12 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 176, 178 (1963). 
 14. Id. 
3
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liable for acts executed by the subsidiary that fall “within the scope of the 
agency.”15  To impute liability using this method, courts have stated that: 
When . . . it is charged that [a corporation] is a mere agency . . . of 
[another corporation] and is used as an instrumentality to perpetrate 
fraud, justify wrong[,] . . . or generally to escape liability for what are 
in substance its own acts, courts will put aside the screen and . . . de-
termine affirmatively the truth and place responsibility where it actual-
ly belongs.16 
Courts agree on many of the above-referenced factors, but courts have disa-
greed as to whether an element of fraud is required17 or whether a simple 
injustice in the absence of fraud suffices.18 
Claimants are permitted to proceed with their claims of infringement on 
a number of methods of agency law,19 but the three most traditional methods 
discussed in this Note are actual authority, apparent authority, and ratifica-
tion.20  The Restatement (Third) of Agency, though not binding authority, is 
often referenced by the courts as persuasive authority.21  These three theories 
are used to impute liability to a parent company by showing the parent had 
actual knowledge of an infringement.22 
1.  Actual Authority 
Instances of actual authority arise when the principal, through its speech 
or conduct, objectively leads the agent to reasonably believe that he may act 
on behalf of the principal.23  Actual authority is also referred to as “true au-
 
 15. William J. Rands, Domination of a Subsidiary by a Parent, 32 IND. L. REV. 
421, 443 (1999). 
 16. Own Fumigating Corp. v. Cal. Cyanide Co., 30 F.2d 812, 813 (3d Cir. 1929). 
 17. Miller v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 189 F. Supp. 916, 918 (S.D. W. Va. 1960) 
(stating that “[t]he clue as to what is necessary to disregard corporate entity is . . . the 
element of fraud”). 
 18. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 552 (Fed. Cir. 
1990) (discussing that an element of fraud or injustice suffices). 
 19. Patent infringement agency claims can also be established via implied au-
thority and inherent authority, but this Note focuses on the three most-seen methods 
of actual authority, apparent authority, and ratification.  See Liberty Ammunition, Inc. 
v. United States, 835 F.3d 1388, 1402 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (discussing whether the em-
ployee for the government had implied authority as an agent). 
 20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 84 (AM. LAW INST. 2017). 
 21. Chad Flanders, Toward a Theory of Persuasive Authority, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 
55, 63 (2009). 
 22. While direct infringement has no knowledge requirement, contributory in-
fringement under § 271(c) does have an actual knowledge requirement.  Robert O. 
Bolan & William C. Rooklidge, Imputing Knowledge to Determine Willful Patent 
Infringement, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 157, 161–62 (1996). 
 23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01. 
4
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thority” or “express authority.”24  When an agent follows through with an 
action on behalf of the principal, the agent’s consent is subsequently estab-
lished.25  The crux of deciding if an agent took action with “actual authority” 
centers around whether the agent had “reasonable understanding” that he had 
the authority “at the time the agent takes action” to then take the executed 
infringing action.26 
2.  Apparent Authority 
The next theory by which claimants are usually allowed to proceed in 
infringement cases is apparent authority.  Apparent authority, also known as 
“customary authority,”27 arises when the principal’s speech or conduct objec-
tively leads the claimant to reasonably believe that an actor is an agent of the 
principal and may act on the principal’s behalf.28  Unlike actual authority, 
apparent authority does not have the same ramifications regarding the princi-
pal and agent’s relationship.29  For example, if an agent acting under apparent 
authority, but without actual authority, acts on behalf of the principal, he 
would be breaching his duty owed to the principal by acting outside the scope 
of his authority,30 and the principal would have the right to seek recovery 
from the agent of any losses.31  The Second Circuit has gone so far as to say 
“a principal may be estopped from denying apparent authority [and will be 
held liable as if an agency relationship existed] where ‘the principal’s inten-
tional or negligent acts, including acts of omission, created an appearance of 
authority in the agent.’”32 
3.  Ratification 
The final theory of agency law discussed in this Note is ratification.  
Ratification arises when the principal affirms an act, which did not originally 
bind him, that then generates the same consequences that would have ensued 
if the agent had performed the act with actual authority.33  Ratification has a 
knowledge element, and because the act of ratification requires conduct on 
 
 24. Id. cmt. b. 
 25. Id. cmt. c. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. § 2.03 cmt. b. 
 28. Id. § 2.03. 
 29. Id. cmt. a. 
 30. See id. § 8.09(1). 
 31. Id. cmt. b. 
 32. Joseph Whitcomb, Equitable Estoppel Defense in Intellectual Property In-
fringement Claim, WHITCOMB, SELINSKY, MCAULIFFE PC: LEGAL BLOG (May 12, 
2015, 8:38 AM), http://blog.whitcomblawpc.com/equitable-estoppel-defense/ (quot-
ing Minskoff v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 98 F.3d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 
1996)). 
 33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY ch. 4, intro. note. 
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behalf of the principal that suggests consent, a principal cannot be held liable 
if the ratification was made without some form of knowledge of the material 
facts.34  For example, in a patent case, it must be shown that the parent com-
pany, through its subsidiary, was aware of both the patent at issue and that 
the acts induced or products sold would have constituted an infringement.35 
B.  Imputing Liability by Piercing the Corporate Veil 
The phrase “pierc[ing] the corporate veil” refers to a procedural tool in 
which the judicial system overrides the intrinsic principles of limited liability 
to impute a subsidiary’s liability to a parent corporation.36  The crux of corpo-
rate law is that corporations are legally distinct from the persons who manage 
and own them; therefore, a corporation’s directors and shareholders do not 
share the same liability as their subsidiaries.37  With respect to parent-
subsidiary relationships, one parent corporation often acts as the sole share-
holder of many subsidiaries that operate independently from the parent.38  It 
is economically pragmatic to have more effective “risk-bearers” receive lia-
bility in certain circumstances.39  The reasoning behind this is that many in-
vestors would be discouraged from investing in a certain company if that 
company’s demise would permit creditors to gain access to the entirety of an 
investor’s assets.40 
1.  Veil Piercing 
Though the law generally protects parent corporations from the tortious 
acts of their subsidiaries through limited liability principles,41 piercing the 
corporate veil is the court’s way of creating exceptions in certain circum-
 
 34. Id. § 4.06. 
 35. Robert J. Yarbrough, Inducement of Patent Infringement, YARBROUGH L. 
(Mar. 2011), http://www.yarbroughlaw.com/Publications/pubs_patent12_inducement 
_of_infringement.htm. 
 36. Pierce, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
pierce#legalDictionary (last visited Apr. 7, 2017). 
 37. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 
CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1039 (1991). 
 38. Matheson, supra note 5, at 1094. 
 39. Thompson, supra note 37, at 1039.  For example, Thompson notes “[t]he 
possibility that the failure of a business would allow its creditors to reach all of an 
investor’s nonbusiness assets might deter a risk-averse investor from investing . . . . 
Limited liability encourages these investments.”  Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See TIP Sys., LLC v. SBC Operations, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 745, 753–54 
(S.D. Tex. 2008) (“In deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil, a court ‘must start 
from the general rule that the corporate entity should be recognized and upheld, un-
less specific, unusual circumstances call for an exception.’” (quoting Manville Sales 
Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F. 2d 544, 552 (Fed. Cir. 1990))). 
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stances.42  Courts differ by state regarding the specific factors taken into ac-
count when deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil, but most courts 
agree on an established “two-pronged” test: (1) “there must be ‘such unity of 
interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and 
the individual no longer exist,’” and (2) “it must be true that, ‘if the acts are 
treated as those of the corporation alone, an inequitable result will follow.’”43  
Courts interpret the second prong differently, but most have held that the 
second prong is satisfied if “a corporation is so undercapitalized that it is un-
able to meet debts that . . . arise in the normal course of business or when a 
plaintiff has been misled by the corporate structure of an enterprise.”44  When 
a court decides to override limited liability principles in these situations, it 
must do so with the Internal Affairs doctrine in mind. 
2.  Choice of Law (the Internal Affairs Doctrine) 
Corporate veil piercing is an issue of state law45 and thus involves a 
choice of law analysis in federal courts.46  This can be difficult when dealing 
with multinational parent companies.47  Many times, a multinational parent 
corporation will have multiple subsidiary companies incorporated in various 
locations throughout the United States.48  Therefore, when a claim is filed 
against one of the subsidiary companies, the claimant often goes after the 
multinational parent company by attempting to pierce the corporate veil.49 
The choice of law concept governing parent-subsidiary liability is 
known as the Internal Affairs doctrine.50  The doctrine obtained its name from 
the idea that the relations between the owners, managers, and the entity itself 
(or between the parent and the subsidiary from an intellectual property stand-
 
 42. See Thompson, supra note 37, at 1041. 
 43. Note, Piercing the Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Fed-
eral Common Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 853, 854 (1982) [hereinafter Piercing the Cor-
porate Law Veil] (quoting Automotriz del Golfo de Cal. S.A. v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1, 
3 (Cal. 1957)). 
 44. Id. at 855 (footnote omitted). 
 45. See Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 
371, 378–79 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that choice of state law applies when determining 
whether to pierce the corporate veil to impute a subsidiary’s liability to a parent cor-
poration). 
 46. See generally United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 (1998) (stating that 
federal law does not apply just because a federal statute is involved). 
 47. See generally Richard M. Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of 
the Internal Affairs Doctrine in Corporation Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 29 (1987). 
 48. See Matheson, supra note 5, at 1093–94. 
 49. Id. at 1094–95. 
 50. Buxbaum, supra note 47, at 43 (relating the choice of law principle to the 
Internal Affairs doctrine by noting that “the internal affairs of a corporation normally 
should be governed by the law of the state of incorporation”). 
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point) are “the province of the state[s] to govern.”51  When early state courts 
were faced with situations that required finding relief for shareholders of for-
eign corporations, they did not know if they had the authority to bring these 
shareholders exhaustive relief due to a potential lack of jurisdiction over for-
eign entities.52  These types of situations are what eventually led the courts to 
adopt the Internal Affairs doctrine.53  The Internal Affairs doctrine, though 
different in each state, generally says that “the internal affairs of a corporation 
normally should be governed by the law of the state of incorporation.”54 
Because the standard for piercing the corporate veil varies by state,55 
balancing tests are frequently used instead of bright-line rules.56  The majori-
ty of courts agree that at least two elements must be shown:57 (1) a domina-
tion of the subsidiary by the parent and (2) that the parent caused the subsidi-
ary to act in some unjust way.58  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit (“Federal Circuit”), which hears all patent appeals, considers many 
factors when deciding whether to pierce the corporate veil, but it has noted 
that “[t]he court . . . must ‘start from the general rule that the corporate entity 
should be recognized and upheld, unless specific, unusual circumstances call 
for an exception.’”59 
 
 51. Id. at 32. 
 52. See id. at 43–44 (giving the history of the internal affairs doctrine). 
 53. See id. at 44 (demonstrating the emergence of the “choice of law rule in the 
full faith and credit clause”).  As Buxbaum notes, “[The internal affairs doctrine, i]n 
and of itself, . . . provides no direct guide for our particular problems of conflicting 
state law.  The very weakness of a minimum ‘uniformity’ scrutiny, however, suggests 
that only procedural and remedial concepts . . . are at the heart of any . . . differentia-
tion between truly intractable interstate conflicts and . . . problems of conflicting 
mandates.”  Id. at 44–45. 
 54. See id. at 43. 
 55. See, e.g., Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 
F.3d 371, 378–79 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 56. See Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644, 646 
(2014) (providing an analysis of “bright-line rules and open-ended standards” and 
“with what degree of specificity should the [c]ourt[s] enunciate controlling principles 
of doctrine”). 
 57. See Thomas H. Clarke, Jr., Under CERCLA, Piercing the Corporate Veil to 
Reach Shareholders of Corporate Owner/Operator Is Determined by State Law, 





 58. See id. 
 59. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 552 (Fed. Cir. 
1990) (quoting Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 273 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (“[A] court may 
exert its equitable powers and disregard the corporate entity if it decides that piercing 
the veil will prevent fraud, illegality, injustice, a contravention of public policy, or 
prevent the corporation from shielding someone from criminal liability.”). 
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C.  Imputing Liability Through Standard Inducement Principles 
Finally, liability may be imputed to a parent corporation through stand-
ard inducement principles.60  To impute liability through inducement, a par-
ent company must either induce or contribute to the subsidiary’s infringement 
by encouraging, selling, or importing an infringing component that was sub-
sequently utilized in the subsidiary’s manufacture, use, or sale of a patented 
product.61  Courts tend to hold these parent companies indirectly liable, not 
because they themselves infringed, but because they “actively induce[d]” 
their subsidiaries to infringe.62  The pertinent part of the Patent Act that co-
vers inducement principles is § 271(b).63 
In its entirety, the text of § 271(b) of the Patent Act states that 
“[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an 
infringer.”64  But what exactly qualifies as “inducing” or “infringing”?  In-
ducement means to encourage another party to take an action that it may not 
have taken had you not interfered.65  With patents, one cannot be said to have 
infringed unless every aspect of the patent is infringed.66  Courts have strug-
gled to determine what conduct is required on behalf of the parent to “induce” 
infringing, as well as what the parent must “know and intend” to be held indi-
rectly liable for the infringement.67 
In an attempt to unveil the intent of the inducing parent company, courts 
have tried to look beyond simply selling a patented product to instances of 
advertising or instruction on how to use the product in a prohibited way.68  In 
1952, the Patent Act69 became law, which finally disconnected the idea of 
 
 60. See Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
225, 229–30 (2005). 
 61. See id. at 228–32. 
 62. See id. at 226, 230. 
 63. Id. at 226.  See also 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012). 
 64. § 271(b). 
 65. See Lemley, supra note 60, at 228 (using Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary to 
define “induce”). 
 66. See Canton Bio-Med., Inc. v. Integrated Liner Techs., Inc., 216 F.3d 1367, 
1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 67. See Lemley, supra note 60, at 226. 
 68. Holly v. Vergennes Mach. Co., 4 F. 74, 82 (D. Vt. 1880) (“If all they did was 
to make and sell these pumps merely, probably they would not infringe by that alone.  
But the answer and proofs go beyond this. . . . The effect of the whole clearly is that 
they participated and concurred in putting in the whole by furnishing the pumps for 
that purpose, and this is sufficient to make them liable as infringers.”). 
 69. See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified at 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 1–376 2012)).  For a brief explanation, see The Patent Act of 1952, LAWS.COM, 
http://patent.laws.com/patent-act-of-1952/patent-act-of-1952-main-sections (last vis-
ited Apr. 7, 2017) (noting “the Patent Act of 1952 affirmed that patent rights from 
that time onward would be enforced according to federal statutes” and “also reordered 
the government agency responsible for patent rights”). 
9
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inducement from contributory infringement70 – a form of secondary liability 
for direct infringement – and separated the two offenses into two sections of 
the Act,71 § 271(b), covering inducement, and § 271(c), covering contributory 
infringement.72  This Note will focus on § 271(b) inducement. 
III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The field of patent law has been remolded over the last few decades by 
decisions from both the Supreme Court of the United States and the Federal 
Circuit.73  The Federal Circuit has led the way in developing the process for 
determining if an infringement exists and who should be held liable.74  The 
following is a summary of how case law has evolved over the last few dec-
ades regarding this issue. 
A.  Infringement Liability Imputed via Agency Principles 
Infringement imputed via agency principles rests upon an entirely dif-
ferent form of infringement – vicarious infringement.75  Contributory in-
fringement revolves around tort law and imputed intent, but vicarious in-
fringement fixates on principles of agency law and the doctrine of respondeat 
superior.76  Respondeat superior is a doctrine that holds “a master liable for 
the wrong of a servant.”77  As it pertains to this discussion, respondeat supe-
rior includes the principles for holding a principal company liable for the 
infringement (or wrong) of its agent “if it [the infringement] was committed 
within the scope of . . . agency.”78 
When attempting to impute vicarious infringement liability, the defend-
ant can be held liable for the agent’s infringement when “the direct infringer 
is the defendant’s agent under common-law principles.”79  Additionally, be-
fore an agency relationship can exist, it must have been agreed upon by the 
parties that the other shall “act on his behalf and subject to his control.”80  
 
 70. Lemley, supra note 60, at 227 (“[T]he earliest cases focusing on efforts to 
induce infringement did not treat it as a separate offense, but rather as evidence sup-
porting the requisite affirmative intent for a case of contributory infringement.”). 
 71. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(b)–(c) (2012). 
 72. Id.; see also Lemley, supra note 60, at 227. 
 73. Kristen Jakobsen Osenga, Recent Developments in Patent Law, 3 AKRON 
INTELL. PROP. J. 303, 304 (2009). 
 74. See generally id. at 312–15. 
 75. Irfan A. Lateef & Marko R. Zoretic, Parent/Subsidiary Liability Issues in 
Patent Litigation, 21 A.B.A. INTELL. PROP. LITIG. COMMITTEE 1, 11 (2010). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Respondeat Superior, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/legal/respondeat%20superior (last visited Apr. 7, 2017). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Lateef & Zoretic, supra note 75, at 11. 
 80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2017). 
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Unlike contributory infringement, knowledge of the actual infringement is 
unnecessary with vicarious liability through agency principles.81  In Travel 
Sentry, Inc. v. Tropp,82 a 2012 infringement case, the Federal Circuit reiterat-
ed this principle when it required that § 271(b) standard inducement princi-
ples be used instead of agency principles to hold an infringer liable because 
the alleged inducer had knowledge of the patented material and “induced the 
performance of the steps.”83  The court abandoned allegations of vicarious 
liability and instead found liability through standard inducement principles 
because the terms of the contract in question did not contain any “express or 
implicit agreement that TSA [would] act on Travel Sentry’s behalf or subject 
to its control,” as would be necessary for an agency relationship to exist.84 
More recently, the Federal Circuit expanded its grounds for ruling in fa-
vor of plaintiffs on the basis of agency principles when it decided Akamai 
Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.85  In Akamai, the plaintiffs 
alleged that Limelight infringed many of their patents.86  It was decided at 
trial that the defendant’s customers, not the defendant itself, implemented the 
methods at issue in the case, but the jury still found Limelight responsible for 
its customers’ actions.87  After post-trial motions, the district court denied 
Limelight’s motion “for judgment of noninfringement as a matter of law” but 
later granted its motion for reconsideration.88  On appeal, the Federal Circuit 
reinstated the verdict against Limelight.89  The Federal Circuit reasoned that 
not only could one be found liable for infringement under traditional agency 
principles, but one could also be found liable in cases where “an alleged in-
fringer conditions participation in an activity [by some form of dominion, 
control,] or receipt of a benefit upon performance of a step or steps of a pa-
tented method and establishes the manner or timing of that performance.”90  
Here, the Federal Circuit recognized that Limelight “condition[ed] its cus-
tomers’ use of its content . . . and that Limelight establishe[d] the manner or 
timing of its customers’ performance.”91  This case expanded the use of agen-
cy principles by recognizing that consumer infringement can be imputed to a 
company that substantially controls the consumers’ actions.92  The Federal 
Circuit’s decision in Akamai is just one example of how courts have expand-
 
 81. Lateef & Zoretic, supra note 75, at 11. 
 82. Travel Sentry, Inc. v. Tropp, 497 F. App’x 958 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 83. Id. at 967. 
 84. Id. at 966. 
 85. Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 86. Id. at 1024. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1023. 
 91. Id. at 1024. 
 92. Id. at 1025. 
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ed their ability to find parent companies liable via traditional agency princi-
ples.93  
B.  Infringement Liability Imputed by Piercing the Corporate Veil 
According to the Federal Circuit, “[p]atent infringement is a tort,”94 and, 
as with any other tort, “a corporate officer [may be held] personally liable for 
his tortious acts,” “even when taken on behalf of the corporation.”95  To be 
held liable for direct infringement, “invocation of [the] general principles 
relating to piercing the corporate veil” is necessary.96  The purpose of the 
corporate veil theory is to protect a company’s investors and officers from 
being held personally liable for infringement that is committed “in the name 
of the corporation, unless the corporation is the officers’ ‘alter ego.’”97  The 
underlying theory behind the alter ego doctrine encompasses “the general 
idea of going behind the corporate form, either to hold an individual or corpo-
rate shareholder responsible for the acts or debts of a corporation, or to rec-
ognize a corporate family as a single economic enterprise.”98  Additionally, 
the decision of whether to pierce the corporate veil and hold a parent compa-
ny liable for subsidiary infringements is, because of the Internal Affairs doc-
trine, a matter of state law and therefore is not held to a uniform standard, 
though there has been evolution in the Federal Circuit’s approach to piercing 
the corporate veil in recent years.99 
For example, in a 1988 case100 involving a patentholder for a railroad 
car hydraulic device who successfully filed suit against a corporation that 
owned 50% of the infringing corporation’s stock,101 the Federal Circuit ruled 
that simply owning a vast majority of stock does not, by itself, satisfy the 
prerequisite to pierce the corporate veil.102  The Federal Circuit compared this 
 
 93. See generally id. 
 94. Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008), 
mandate recalled and amended by 557 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 95. Hoover Grp., Inc. v. Custom Metalcraft, Inc., 84 F.3d 1408, 1411 (Fed. Cir. 
1996). 
 96. Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1579 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986). 
 97. Wordtech Sys., Inc. v. Integrated Networks Sols., Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1313 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Wechsler v. Macke Int’l Trade, Inc., 486 F.3d 1286, 1295 
(Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 98. See Piercing the Corporate Law Veil, supra note 43, at 853 n.1 (explaining 
the underlying theory behind the alter ego doctrine). 
 99. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text. 
 100. A. Stucki Co. v. Worthington Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 593 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 101. Id. at 594–95. 
 102. Id. at 596 (citing Milgo Elec. Corp. v. United Bus. Commc’ns, Inc., 623 F.2d 
645, 662 (10th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)). 
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case to two other similar Federal Circuit cases in its holding.103  In its Stucki 
analysis, the court mentioned that in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical 
Laboratories, Inc., a company that “acquired [a] new drug application and 
nothing more” was not considered a “successor” that would be subsequently 
liable through the drug application’s previous owner.104  However, the Stucki 
court also said that in the 1986 case of Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 
a company was considered a successor when it bought a facility that it then 
used to manufacture “infringing products.”105 
Over twenty years after Premo and Kloster, the Federal Circuit decided 
Wordtech Systems, Inc. v. Integrated Network Solutions, Inc. (“INSC”),106 a 
case where the plaintiff alleged the defendant infringed its patent on a CD-
duplicating technology.107  Wordtech filed suit against INSC and its employ-
ees, and a jury found all defendants liable for infringement.108  The defend-
ant’s employees appealed, denying they were officers of INSC, challenging 
INSC’s corporate status, and claiming patent invalidity defenses they ne-
glected to claim at trial.109  A jury found that all defendants were liable for 
willful patent infringement,110 although the case was later vacated on other 
grounds.111  The court further recognized in the 2007 case Wechsler v. Macke 
International Trade, Inc.112 that the alter ego doctrine is also not exclusive to 
patent infringement cases.113 
C.  Inducement Liability Through § 271(b) 
The § 271(b) principles governing infringement have remained similar 
over the years.114  The Federal Circuit had not substantially altered its meth-
 
 103. Id. at 598.  See also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 843 F.2d 
1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 
1582 (Fed. Cir. 1986), as amended on reh’g (Aug. 15, 1986), overruled by Knorr-
Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (en banc). 
 104. A. Stucki, 849 F.2d at 597 (discussing Eli Lilly & Co., 843 F.2d at 1380–82). 
 105. Id. (discussing Kloster Speedsteel, 793 F.2d at 1582). 
 106. Wordtech Sys, Inc. v. Integrated Network Sols., Inc., 609 F.3d 1308 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010). 
 107. Id. at 1310. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1311–12. 
 110. Id. at 1312. 
 111. Id. at 1314–15. 
 112. Wechsler v. Macke Int’l Trade, Inc., 486 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 113. Id. at 1295 (“Since the alter ego issue is not unique to patent law, we apply 
the law of the regional circuit.”). 
 114. See generally Karthik Kumar, Note, Of Deep-Fryers and (Semiconductor) 
Chips: Why Ignorance of a Patent Is No Excuse for Its Indirect Infringement, 40 
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ods of finding liability when determining the level of “knowledge and intent” 
necessary to realize § 271(b) liability until its most recent decisions in Com-
mil115 and Global-Tech.116  Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc.117 noted that 
inducement “requires more than just intent to cause the acts that produce di-
rect infringement.”118  The court noted that inducement also requires that “the 
alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement and possessed specific 
intent to encourage another’s infringement.”119  Finally, the Federal Circuit 
has consistently held that in order to recognize induced infringement under § 
271(b), “all the steps of a claimed method must be performed.”120 
For example, in the 1990 case of Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & 
Lomb Inc.,121 the lower court held that the patent in question was valid and 
infringed upon but that the defendant “had not actively induced infringement” 
of the patent subsequent to the sale of business.122  On appeal, the Federal 
Circuit expanded the breadth of § 271(b).123  The Federal Circuit noted that 
before the Patent Act, “infringement” itself had not been defined by statute, 
but that case law had subdivided infringement into “direct infringement” and 
“contributory infringement.”124  The concept of contributory infringement125 
was codified in § 271(b) and § 271(c).126  Subsequently, the concept of “ac-
tive[] induce[ment]”127 emerged, which is another form of direct infringe-
ment.128  Even though § 271(b) does not specifically state that any level of 
intent is required for active inducement,129 the court recognized that § 271(b) 
was enacted simply as a codification of pre-Patent Act law and that the intent 
to perform the actions that led to the infringement at issue must still be prov-
en in order to qualify as active inducement.130  In the Hewlett-Packard case, 
 
 115. See infra notes 152–57 and accompanying text. 
 116. See infra notes 144–51and accompanying text. 
 117. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 543 F.3d 683 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 118. Id. at 699 (quoting DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006)). 
 119. Id. (quoting DSU, 471 F.3d at 1306). 
 120. Travel Sentry, Inc. v. Tropp, 497 F. App’x 958, 967 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 121. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). 
 122. Id. at 1466. 
 123. Id. at 1469. 
 124. Id. at 1468–69. 
 125. Id. at 1469 (defining contributory infringement as “any other activity where, 
although not technically making, using or selling, the defendant displayed sufficient 
culpability to be held liable as an infringer”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012)) (stating that “proof of actual intent to 
cause the acts which constitute the infringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding 
active inducement”). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
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the Federal Circuit could not overlook the absence of proof of intent to per-
form the infringing actions.131 
Further, the knowledge requirement established in Hewlett-Packard was 
expanded in Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc.132  In Manville, 
the plaintiff alleged infringement of a patent against a corporation.133  The 
lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, and the appellate court held that, in 
this case, the officers of the corporation could not be held liable for the direct 
infringement or for causing the corporation to infringe through active in-
ducement.134  Also, the court stated that to be considered infringement by 
inducement, the “alleged infringer must be shown . . . to have knowingly in-
duced infringement.”135  The Federal Circuit ultimately decided that “specific 
intent to encourage another’s infringement” must be shown136 and not just the 
plain knowledge of the acts leading to infringement.137 
In PB & J Software, LLC v. Acronis, Inc.,138 the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Missouri dealt with allegations of induced and willful 
infringement of a patented method for sharing storage space on a comput-
er.139  The patentee claimed that the defendant infringed by “offering services 
and licensing software implementing . . . ‘seed’ backup[s]” and willfully in-
fringed upon the patent because the defendant knew of the patent’s existence 
yet still infringed.140  The district court referenced the Federal Circuit’s re-
quirement for inducement complaints to “contain facts plausibly showing that 
[defendants] specifically intended [others] to infringe the [patent-in-suit] and 
knew that [others’] acts constituted infringement.”141  Regarding the willful 
infringement allegation, the district court again relied on precedent when it 
explained that, in order to approve willful infringement, the infringement 
must have been “with full knowledge of the . . . patents.”142 
But what level of “knowledge” or “intent” is actually required to impute 
liability via § 271(b)?  Is unawareness an adequate defense?  Most recently, 
the Supreme Court of the United States decided two cases that affected judi-
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). 
 133. Id. at 549. 
 134. Id. at 549, 553–54. 
 135. Id. at 553. 
 136. Id.  See also Hewlett-Packard, 909 F.2d at 1469. 
 137. Manville, 917 F.2d at 553. 
 138. PB & J Software, LLC v. Acronis, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 2d 815 (E.D. Mo. 
2012). 
 139. Id. at 817. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 821 (alterations in original) (quoting R+L Carriers, Inc. v. DriverTech 
LLC (In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig.), 681 F.3d 
1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 
 142. See id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sentry Prot. Prods., Inc. v. Eagle Mfg. 
Co., 400 F.3d 910, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
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cial interpretation of inducement law.143  One of these cases was Global-Tech 
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.144  In Global-Tech, the Supreme Court held that 
“induced infringement . . . requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute 
patent infringement.”145  The patentee in Global-Tech had invented a deep 
fryer and sued a competitor’s foreign supplier for inducement.146  The alleged 
inducer argued that he did not realize the fryer was patented and subsequently 
could not be held liable for inducement because he lacked the requisite men-
tal state of an infringer.147  The Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s 
decision that § 271(b) specifically requires that the infringer “knew or should 
have known that his actions would induce actual infringement” and, in this 
case, knew or should have known of the patent’s existence.148  The Supreme 
Court decided that § 271(b) infringement does require knowledge149 that the 
actions of the alleged inducer amount to patent infringement.150  The Su-
preme Court subsequently affirmed the appellate decision, finding that the 
evidence was clear enough to support the argument that the alleged infringer 
had sufficient knowledge under the “doctrine of willful blindness.”151 
In Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the Court affirmed Global-
Tech and explained that its decision in Global-Tech should be interpreted as 
requiring knowledge of the infringement to support a finding of inducement 
liability.152  Additionally, the Court abandoned the framework once holding 
that belief of a patent’s invalidity is a defense to infringement by induce-
 
 143. See generally Kumar, supra note 114, at 730 (noting the change in law by the 
Supreme Court in 2011). 
 144. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011). 
 145. Id. at 766. 
 146. Id. at 757–59. 
 147. Id. at 759–60. 
 148. Id. at 759 (quoting SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). 
 149. Id. at 766 (“[P]ersons who know enough to blind themselves to direct proof 
of critical facts in effect have actual knowledge of those facts.” (citing United States 
v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc))). 
 150. Id. at 765–66. 
 151. Id. at 766.  The Court noted: 
 
The doctrine of willful blindness is well established in criminal law.  Many 
criminal statutes require proof that a defendant acted knowingly or willfully, 
and courts applying the doctrine of willful blindness hold that defendants can-
not escape the reach of these statutes by deliberately shielding themselves 




 152. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1926 (2015); Dennis 
Crouch, Commil v. Cisco: Belief-of-Invalidity Not a Defense to Inducement, 
PATENTLY-O (May 26, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/05/invalidity-defense-
inducement.html. 
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ment.153  The patentee in Commil claimed that the defendant had both directly 
infringed and induced others to infringe by selling others the patented equip-
ment.154  The lower court found the defendant liable, and the Federal Circuit 
remanded and held that the defendant should have been permitted to show its 
“good-faith belief” that the patent in question was invalid.155  Upon review, 
the Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment, reasoning that 
basing a defense to inducement on the belief that a patent is invalid would 
create a slew of bad consequences, such as allowing all accused inducers to 
come forward and state a “theory of invalidity,” likely accompanied by end-
less debates.156  The Court in Commil ultimately decided that a “belief in 
invalidity is no defense to a claim of induced infringement.”157 
Commil and Global-Tech have contributed to the understanding of in-
ducement infringement under § 271(b) by making clear that, when dealing 
with patent infringement, ignorance is not bliss.  Under Commil and Global-
Tech, alleging that one is unaware of a patent’s existence or its validity when 
one should reasonably have knowledge of the fact will not protect oneself 
from liability under § 271(b). 
The Federal Circuit has decided many recent cases regarding induce-
ment liability, liability driven by agency principles, and situations involving 
corporate veil piercing.  Part IV of this Note discusses and compares how the 
Federal Circuit applies the methods from its recent decisions to patent in-
fringement cases. 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
This Part will compare how, if at all, the Federal Circuit’s decision dif-
fers when applying the three traditional legal principles of holding parent 
companies liable for subsidiary infringements in patent infringement cases.  
Because the Federal Circuit’s decisions regarding the law of inducement are 
the most developed, the remainder of this Note will primarily focus on § 
271(b) inducement liability.  First, this Part of the Note discusses how, in 
some cases, there is no difference in how the judicial system interprets these 
three traditional methods when applying them to general business and patent 
infringement cases.  Next, this Part discusses when and why the court devi-
ates from traditional application of these methods when dealing with patent 
cases.  Finally, this Part analyzes why the Federal Circuit sometimes decides 
to let defendants off the hook for infringement. 
 
 153. See Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1928–30. 
 154. Id. at 1924. 
 155. Id. at 1924–25. 
 156. Id. at 1929–30. 
 157. Id. at 1931. 
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A.  Similarities Between Traditional and Patent Law Application 
In Wordtech, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that when determining 
whether to pierce the corporate veil, “general principles” are considered.158  
As noted in Part II,159 the corporate veil generally protects a company’s offic-
ers from liability for infringement committed by the officers “in the name of 
the corporation,” unless the alter ego doctrine applies.160  The court in 
Wordtech recognized that these “general principles” that are considered apply 
not only to patent infringement cases, but to all corporate business questions 
that require an analysis of whether to pierce the corporate veil.161  Generally, 
the Federal Circuit, bound by its own precedent and the Supreme Court’s, 
tends to apply general principles of law when hearing patent infringement 
cases.162 
Wordtech was an anomaly in that the allegation of INSC’s lack of cor-
porate status played a significant part in the Federal Circuit’s decision to ul-
timately dismiss the case.163  However, despite the Federal Circuit’s ultimate 
decision in Wordtech, the court’s analysis of veil-piercing principles is note-
worthy.  The court recognized that in situations where an officer’s “personal 
wrongdoing” is in no way backed by justifiable corporate activity, courts 
have a history of assigning personal liability for an officer’s wrongdoings, 
regardless of whether the wrongdoings were committed in the name of the 
corporation.164  Some scholars disagree with assigning personal liability to 
officers at any time and believe that the corporate veil theory of assigning 
liability should only apply to the shareholders of a corporation.165  Until the 
Federal Circuit overturns any of the ingrained principles of corporate veil 
piercing en banc, or until the Supreme Court decides the issue, the Federal 
Circuit is bound by this traditional theory. 
When deciding whether to override limited liability and impute liability 
by piercing the corporate veil, courts remain consistent in their application of 
veil-piercing standards, whether they be directed toward business law cases 
or patent infringement allegations.  The largest interpretive mystery arises 
when the Federal Circuit interprets inducement law principles. 
 
 158. Wordtech Sys., Inc. v. Integrated Networks Sols., Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1314 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 
1565, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 159. See supra Part II.B. 
 160. Wordtech, 609 F.3d at 1313 (quoting Wechsler v. Macke Int’l Trade, Inc., 
486 F.3d 1286, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 161. See id. at 1314. 
 162. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–92 (2006). 
 163. See supra notes 106–11 and accompanying text. 
 164. Wordtech, 609 F.3d at 1314 (quoting Hoover Grp. v. Custom Metalcraft, 
Inc., 84 F.3d 1408, 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
 165. See Lynda J. Oswald, The Personal Liability of Corporate Officers for Pa-
tent Infringement, 44 IDEA 115, 130 (2003). 
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B.  Deviations from Corporate Business Application 
The traditional methods of holding parent companies liable for the acts 
of their subsidiaries remain relatively consistent, regardless of whether the 
court is dealing with typical corporate business law cases or handling a patent 
infringement case.  However, there are inconsistencies when the court utilizes 
standard inducement principles to impute liability.  When determining 
whether to hold a parent company liable for its subsidiaries’ actions, courts 
struggle with determining what has been described as the “two fundamental 
issues” with inducement liability.166  The first issue is what form of conduct 
or action is necessary, and the second issue is what level of knowledge or 
intent is required.167  Since its creation in 1982, the Federal Circuit had not 
harmonized either of these issues168 until the Supreme Court decided Commil 
and Global-Tech.169 
Regarding § 271(b) inducement, unpredictable results led the Federal 
Circuit to three possible methods and definitions for “inducement” as it per-
tains to patent cases: (1) a respondeat superior theory of limitation, (2) an 
expansion of the term to include “efforts” to infringe (encouragement), and 
(3) virtually any action taken on behalf of the defendant to assist another par-
ty in its infringement.170  This Part will discuss briefly the meaning of each 
and what the Federal Circuit should do to clarify the issue in future cases. 
First, the cases of inducement resting upon a respondeat superior theory 
generally involve situations in which claims are brought against the officers 
of a corporation for authorizing their subsidiaries to take the actions that led 
to infringement.171  These cases involve situations where the defendant oper-
ates in a controlling capacity and directs what is considered the “infringing 
behavior” of the subsidiaries, and the court subsequently holds the indirectly 
infringing defendants liable.172 
Moving to the second definition of infringement, cases that involve ef-
forts by parties to encourage infringement, courts have required “affirmative 
conduct encouraging independent third parties to infringe.”173  For example, 
it has been held that an independent sales representative could not be held 
liable when he attended trade shows to tell interested parties about the com-
pany’s product and solicited customers because he “had no more than a pe-
 
 166. Lemley, supra note 60, at 226. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See supra notes 144–57 and accompanying text. 
 170. Lemley, supra note 60, at 229. 
 171. See, e.g., Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls v. Mega Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 
1327, 1341–43 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Hoover Grp., Inc. v. Custom Metalcraft, 84 F.3d 
1408, 1411–12 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 
F.2d 544, 548–49 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  However, these cases also involve methods of 
imputing liability by piercing the corporate veil. 
 172. See Lemley, supra note 60, at 229–30. 
 173. Id. at 230. 
19
Tracy: Imputed Liability
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
590 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
ripheral relationship with [the] direct infringement.”174  When one does not 
directly instruct others to infringe, one falls under the second definition of 
inducement, as one is said to have urged others to take actions that led to 
infringement instead of expressly directing them to do so.175 
Finally, the third definition involves simply assisting a third party in in-
fringement devoid of any urging or encouragement.176  For example, where a 
plaintiff had a series of patents for protein production and filed infringement 
charges against a pharmaceutical company,177 the court held the act of buying 
a product that was deemed “infringing” was inducement if the defendant 
bought the product in a massive quantity that was produced specifically for 
the defendant.178  Patent law is unclear as to exactly how engaged an infring-
ing party must be to have liability imputed upon it, but it appears as if courts 
rule in favor of plaintiffs in cases of liability when the defendant’s conduct 
falls between “control over the infringer” and “any act that aids an infring-
er.”179 
The decisions in Commil and Global-Tech have helped define what lev-
el of knowledge or intent is required to impute liability via § 271(b).180  Un-
der these two cases, a defendant in an alleged infringement case may no long-
er claim unawareness of a patent’s validity or existence as a defense to § 
271(b) inducement infringement when it should have known of the facts.181  
By helping harmonize these three approaches, Commil and Global-Tech have 
aided the judiciary in reaching just outcomes.  The Court essentially oblite-
rated a set of inducement defenses by acknowledging squarely that a plaintiff 
must show that an inducer knew his acts would result in infringement. 
C.  Should Someone Be Let Off the Hook? 
For the last half of a century, the courts that handle patent cases have 
analyzed both parties’ positions in cases of induced or third-party patent in-
fringement instead of solely directing its attention to the party who directly 
infringed on the patent.182  In some cases, courts have held that the indirectly 
infringing party should be held liable.183  However, as noted, the results of 
patent infringement cases have been unpredictable.  Instead of asking the 
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Federal Circuit to apply some form of a balancing test184 that will continue to 
yield unpredictable results, the court should decide each infringement allega-
tion on a case-by-case basis, utilizing bright line rules, therefore allowing for 
further inquiry into the level of specific intent required if the infringer’s ac-
tions are less blameworthy than other cases. 
Albert Einstein once described insanity as “doing the same thing over 
and over and expecting different results.”185  Though Einstein surely did not 
have the Federal Circuit and its decisions in patent law in mind when he 
made that remark, he would likely agree that if the Federal Circuit uses un-
predictable balancing tests that lack clear direction for determining when to 
impute liability in patent infringement cases, the same inconsistent results 
will be reached and the same confusion will remain.  Instead of using incon-
sistent balancing tests that continuously produce variable results, the Federal 
Circuit should implement a bright line rule for the whole country that will 
hopefully prove far more consistent over time. 
The late Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia consistently pressed for 
bright line rules that were easy for courts to understand and follow.186  For-
mer Solicitor General Paul Clement described Justice Scalia as always 
“look[ing] for bright lines in the Constitution wherever he can.”187  Many 
other conservative Supreme Court Justices188 defended balancing tests that 
lacked bright line rules, but Justice Scalia viewed these methods of assigning 
blame with disdain.189  Even though Justice Scalia knew that balancing tests 
were a sometimes necessary evil, he avoided them whenever possible.190 
Unfortunately, he was not always listened to.  Consider the 2016 case of 
Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics Inc. where the Supreme Court 
abolished the bright-line rule of “objective recklessness.”191  The objective 
recklessness standard was a widely used criterion for proving that a patent 
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was willfully infringed.192  The Court reasoned that the standard allowed in-
fringers to “avoid enhanced damages by simply presenting a reasonable de-
fense to infringement at trial.”193  Some believe that removing the application 
of bright line rules such as the objective recklessness rule will, in turn, re-
move a shield that infringers may use to avoid increased damages.194  This 
may have been a preferable result in the particular case of Halo, but their 
complete removal will only add to confusion by omitting the easy-to-follow 
guidelines that judges rely on.  Aside from reducing confusion among judges, 
bright line rules also decrease the number of cases heard on appeal, thus 
clearing up the judges’ dockets.195 
Carefully thought-out rules should govern whenever possible.  Though 
there exist some advantages to balancing tests, such as their flexibility in 
complex cases,196 the benefits of utilizing rules that promote predictability 
outweigh their minimal advantages.  The Federal Circuit should adhere to the 
deeply rooted principles of liability imputation to enhance predictability 
wherever possible.  The judiciary should begin by seeking out the principles 
of law discussed in this Note as its first choice of authority, and only when 
these principles of law fall short should the judiciary turn to mechanisms such 
as balancing tests when seeking to allocate liability for patent infringements 
by subsidiaries.197 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit has recently attempted to make clearer when parent 
companies should be held liable for the patent infringements of their subsidi-
aries, but there will likely always be some level of inconsistency with the 
courts’ decisions.  It is tempting for a parent company to “use the corporate 
structure of the subsidiary to evade obligations” by letting liability fall onto 
the subsidiary, but as this Note discussed, the parent can often be held liable 
for its subsidiaries’ actions anyway.198  The Federal Circuit is sometimes 
inconsistent regarding its opinions on the traditional methods of imputing 
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liability, particularly with the theory of inducement liability.199  The Federal 
Circuit implemented different standards in Hewlett-Packard and Manville, 
and, by avoiding a balancing test, the court reached fair and just results.  
Since then, Commil and Global-Tech have helped define the law with respect 
to inducement liability.  Justice Scalia believed that the true example of in-
voking justice was straightforward – examining matters “one case at a time, 
taking into account all the circumstances, and identifying within the context 
the ‘fair’ result.”200  Unless the court follows the late Supreme Court Justice’s 
lead and abandons the use of balancing tests whenever possible when decid-
ing whether to impute liability in patent infringement cases, the confusion 
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